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Abstract 
We explore a hypothesis about the take-off in inflation that occurred in the early 
1970s. According to the expectations trap hypothesis, the Fed was pushed into 
producing the high inflation out of a fear of violating the public’s inflation 
expectations. We compare this hypothesis with the Phillips curve hypothesis, 
according to which the Fed produced the high inflation as an unfortunate by-product 
of a conscious decision to jump-start a weak economy. Which hypothesis is more 
plausible has important implications for what needs to be done to prevent other 
inflation flare-ups. 
 
Introduction and summary 
Many countries, including the U.S., experienced a costly, high inflation in the 1970s. This 
article reviews some research devoted to understanding why it happened, and what can be 
done to prevent it from happening again.  
  The class of explanations we examine lies squarely in the monetarist tradition: The 
inflation was fueled by the high money growth generated by the US Federal Reserve. To 
understand what needs to be done to prevent a recurrence, it is necessary to understand what 
the Fed’s motives were. We hypothesize that the Fed was in effect pushed into producing the 
high inflation by a rise in the inflationary expectations of the public. In the language of Chari, 
Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998), we say that when a central bank is pressured to produce 
inflation because of a rise in inflation expectations, the economy has fallen into an 
expectations trap. We call this hypothesis about inflation the expectations trap hypothesis. 
  We argue that the dynamics of inflation in the early 1970s are consistent with the 
expectations trap hypothesis. We describe two versions of this hypothesis. We also describe 
an alternative hypothesis, what we call the Phillips curve hypothesis. According to this, 
inflation occurs when a central bank decides to increase money growth to stimulate the 
economy and is willing to accept the risk of high inflation that that entails. The expectations 
trap hypothesis and the Phillips curve hypothesis both maintain that high inflation is a consequence of high money growth. Where they differ is in the motives that they ascribe to 
the central bank. 
  Much of our analysis assessing the various hypotheses about inflation is based on an 
informal review of the historical record. We supplement this discussion by studying a version 
of the expectations trap hypothesis using a general equilibrium, dynamic macroeconomic 
model. There are two reasons that we do this. First, we want to demonstrate that the 
expectations trap hypothesis can be integrated into a coherent view of the overall 
macroeconomy.
1 Second, we want to document that that hypothesis has the potential to 
provide a quantitatively realistic account for the 1970s take-off in inflation. 
  The model we use is the limited participation model studied in Christiano and Gust 
(1999).
2 It requires a specification of monetary policy in the 1970s and for this we use the 
policy rule estimated by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998). The account of the early 1970s that 
we produce using the model posits that a bad supply shock (designed to capture the various 
commodity shortages of the early 1970s) triggered a jump in expected inflation, which then 
became transformed into higher actual inflation because of the nature of monetary policy. We 
find that, consistent with the data, the model predicts stagflation. We view this result as 
supportive of the expectations trap hypothesis. 
  We compare our model with an alternative quantitative model of the 1970s inflation 
proposed by Clarida et al. That model can also explain the rise in inflation in the 1970s as 
reflecting a self-fulfilling increase in inflation expectations. It is a sticky price, rational 
expectations version of the IS–LM model.
3 When we use that model to simulate the 1970s, we 
find that it is inconsistent with the observed stagflation of the time. It predicts that the rise in 
expected and actual inflation triggered by a bad supply shock is associated with a sustained 
rise in employment. We conclude that the limited participation model provides a better 
account of the high inflation of the 1970s than does the sticky price, IS–LM model with 
Clarida et al.’s representation of policy. This result is potentially of independent interest, since 
the latter model is currently in widespread use. 
  We begin with a description of the expectations trap hypothesis and what it implies for 
policy. Then, we review the 1960s and 1970s and provide an informal assessment of the 
expectations trap and Phillips curve hypotheses. We provide a quantitative evaluation of the 
expectations trap hypothesis using the limited participation model as a vehicle. We then 
provide an assessment of the Clarida et al. model. What is an expectations trap? 
Inflation is a substantial rise in prices, sustained over a period of a decade or more. In this 
section, we discuss the class of hypotheses about the dynamics of inflation that is the focus of 
our analysis. We begin with an abstract definition of an expectations trap. We then describe 
two particular types of expectations traps. Finally, we ask, What is the ultimate cause of 
inflation under the expectations trap hypothesis? 
The trap, defined 
An expectations trap is a situation in which an increase in private agents’ expectations of 
inflation pressures the central bank into increasing actual inflation.
4 There are different 
mechanisms by which this can happen. However, the basic idea is always the same. The 
scenario is initiated by a rise in the public’s inflation expectations. Exactly why their inflation 
expectations rise doesn’t really matter. What does matter is what happens next. On the basis 
of this rise in expectations, private agents take certain actions which then place the Fed in a 
dilemma: either respond with an accommodating monetary policy which then produces a rise 
in actual inflation or refuse to accommodate and risk a recession. A central bank that is 
responsive to concerns about the health of the economy could very well wind up choosing the 
path of accommodation, that is, falling into an expectations trap. 
A cost-push trap and a working capital trap 
We describe two versions of the expectations trap hypothesis, which differ according to the 
precise mechanism by which higher inflation expectations pressure the Fed into supplying 
more inflation. One mechanism, presented in Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998), is 
similar to the conventional cost-push theory of inflation. We call it a cost-push expectations 
trap. Here is how it works. Higher inflation expectations lead people to demand, and receive, 
higher wage settlements. Firms are happy to pay the increased wages because, expecting a 
rise in the general price level, they think they can pass along the higher wage costs in the form 
of higher prices. This puts the Fed in the dilemma mentioned above. The Fed can produce the 
inflation everyone expects by raising money growth. Or, if it does not, it will put the economy 
through a recession. Under some circumstances, the Fed will not be willing to tolerate the 
recession and will feel compelled to produce inflation. In this case, the Fed ends up validating 
the original rise in inflation expectations. We call this hypothesis about inflation, the cost-
push version of the expectations trap hypothesis.
5   We shall see that this version of the expectations trap hypothesis encounters some 
difficulties explaining the high inflation of the 1970s. We now describe another version of this 
hypothesis, which does not have these problems. 
  The limited participation model of money, which is analyzed below, highlights a 
different mechanism by which an expectations trap can occur. We call this a working capital 
expectations trap. It relies on the assumption that firms must borrow funds in advance 
(acquire working capital) in order to finance some or all of the inputs needed to carry on 
production. Under these circumstances a high nominal interest rate has a negative impact on 
economic activity because it raises the cost of working capital. To see how this mechanism 
works, suppose, again, that there is a jump in inflation expectations. Private agents, correctly 
perceiving that the central bank is afraid of the negative output effects of high interest rates, 
anticipate that the higher future inflation will be associated with low real interest rates. This 
leads them to cut back on saving, putting upward pressure on interest rates in the market for 
loanable funds. This places the central bank in a dilemma. If it keeps the money supply 
unchanged, then the higher expected inflation will not occur. However, the reduced saving 
would result in high interest rates. By drying up the supply of working capital, this would 
significantly slow the economy. A central bank that is concerned about the health of the 
private economy may prefer a second option: prevent a substantial rise in interest rates by 
injecting money into the economy. This has the effect of validating the initial jump in 
inflation expectations. Choosing this second option is another way to fall into an expectations 
trap. We call this hypothesis about inflation the working capital version of the expectations 
trap hypothesis.  
Ultimate cause of inflation 
Where, under the expectations trap hypothesis, does the ultimate responsibility for inflation 
lie? To answer this requires identifying the cause of the rise in inflation expectations. 
According to the expectations trap hypothesis, the cause lies with monetary institutions 
themselves. If, for example, the nature of those institutions is such that people cannot imagine 
a set of circumstances in which the central bank would accommodate a rise in inflation, then 
there is little reason for inflation expectations to suddenly jump. Expectations traps just 
couldn’t happen. 
  To see this, imagine there is an oil shortage. Certainly, one might reasonably expect 
this to lead to a rise in the price level. Because of various lags, this rise might actually take place over a period of time, maybe even a year or two. But, there is nothing in conventional 
economic reasoning that would connect an oil shortage to the sustained, decade-long rise in 
prices that we call inflation. Anyone who inferred from a 10 percent jump in the price level in 
one year that prices would continue jumping like this and be 100 percent higher in ten years, 
would be viewed as a crank. Such a person would seem as foolish as the person who, seeing 
the temperature outside drop one degree from one day to the next, forecasts a drop in the 
temperature by 100 degrees over the next 100 days. 
  Now consider an economy whose monetary institutions are known to assign a high 
priority to output and employment. In addition, suppose that that economy’s central bank has 
no way of credibly committing itself in advance to keeping money growth low. In a society 
like this, the idea that inflation could take off seems quite plausible. In such a society, even 
seemingly irrelevant events could spark a rise in inflation expectations. For example, a person 
who revised upward their inflation forecast in the wake of an oil shock would now not 
necessarily seem like a crank. There are a number of ways they could back up their forecast 
with sensible economic reasoning. Such a person could use either of the two expectations trap 
arguments described above. 
  So, the expectations trap hypothesis lays responsibility for inflation with monetary 
institutions. To reduce the possibility of expectations traps, the institutions must be designed 
so that the central bank’s commitment to fighting inflation is not in doubt. Under these 
circumstances, people participating in wage negotiations who profess to believe inflation is 
about to take off will be met with disbelief rather than a higher wage settlement. 
  How exactly monetary institutions should be designed to reduce the likelihood of an 
expectations trap is controversial. But, there is one point on which there appears to be 
agreement. The central banker at the very least should make a show of not being too 
concerned about the health of the economy. An example of this can be found in the reaction to 
a famous (or infamous) speech by the then vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan 
Blinder, at a conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in 1994. In that speech, Blinder 
acknowledged that it is feasible for a central bank to influence unemployment and output. 
This generated an uproar. Many who objected probably did not do so because they thought 
what Blinder said was wrong. Instead, they simply thought it unwise that a central banker 
should let on that he thinks about such things.
6 Why shouldn’t he let on? One possibility—the 
one emphasized in the expectations trap hypothesis—is that the greater the apparent concern by the central bank for the real economy, the greater is the risk of falling into an expectations 
trap. 
Background events 
We begin with a brief review of the basic economic events leading up to the high inflation of 
the 1970s. We argue that the data appear consistent with the hypothesis that the U.S. became 
ensnared in an expectations trap by the late 1960s and early 1970s. We then compare the 
expectations trap hypothesis about inflation with another hypothesis. According to that 
hypothesis, the Fed consciously produced the high inflation as a necessary, though 
unfortunate, byproduct of its aggressive attempts to stimulate the economy. We call this the 
Phillips curve hypothesis, because it involves the Fed’s attempts to exploit the Phillips curve. 
Finally, we look at the data to identify the economic consequences of the takeoff in inflation 
in the early 1970s. 
Events leading up to the 1970s: Setting the trap 
An important part of the story of the inflation of the 1970s begins with the recession of the 
early 1960s. That recession helped bring the administration of John F. Kennedy into power. 
Kennedy brought with him the best and the brightest Keynesian minds of the time. The 
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) was the very distinguished Keynesian 
economist, Walter Heller. Members of the CEA included another distinguished Keynesian 
economist, the future Nobel laureate, James Tobin. Government policy was animated by the 
Keynesian conviction that if the economy was performing below its potential, then it was the 
responsibility of the government to use the fiscal and monetary policies at its command to 
restore it to strength. Figure 1 displays the federal funds rate and the growth rate of the 
monetary base, using annual data. Also exhibited are the years designated by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research to be periods of business cycle contraction (shaded area) and 
expansion (non-shaded area).
7 The figure shows that the growth rate in the monetary base 
began to pick up in the early 1960s. The CEA also set to work to craft an expansionary fiscal 
policy, and one of the products of those efforts was the tax reduction legislation of 1964. 
Confidence in the feasibility and desirability of Keynesian stabilization policy soared with the 
long expansion of the 1960s. 
  Figure 2 shows that inflation started to pick up with a few years’ delay, in 1965.
8 As 
these observations suggest, that initial rise in inflation is probably not an example of an 
expectations trap. It is probably best understood in terms of the Phillips curve hypothesis: It was the consequence of expansionary monetary policy, deliberately undertaken to stimulate a 
weak economy. It is the dynamics of inflation after the initial uptick in the 1960s that appears 
to take on the character of an expectations trap. 
  Figures 1 and 2 show that inflation proceeded to hit three peaks, one in the early 
1970s, one in early 1975, and the final one in late 1980. The initial pickup in inflation in the 
1960s was noted with alarm by policymakers, who responded with a very sharp rise in the 
federal funds rate in 1969. This policy tightening is often credited with producing the 1970 
recession. To the dismay of policymakers, the inflation rate continued to be high, even as the 
economy began to slide into recession (see figure 1). Arthur Burns, the chairman of the 
Federal Reserve at this time, said in a speech at Pepperdine College, Los Angeles, in 
December 7, 1970:  
The rules of economics are not working in quite the way they used to. 
Despite extensive unemployment in our country, wage rate increases 
have not moderated. Despite much idle industrial capacity, 
commodity prices continue to rise rapidly. (Burns, 1978, p. 118) 
  Burns spoke with a special authority, when he referred to “the rules of economics.” He 
was the author, together with William Mitchell, of an exhaustive and authoritative treatise on 
the history of the U.S. business cycle (Burns and Mitchell, 1934). So, it is not surprising that, 
indeed, things were not quite working as they used to. Figure 3 shows inflation over the 
period 1900 to 1960. That figure shows that, usually, inflation was low or falling during 
recessions. 
  The policy establishment became convinced that the underlying driving force of 
inflation was inflation expectations and that these expectations were all but impervious to 
recession. In a statement before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress in 1971, 
Burns explained the role of inflation expectations as follows:  
Consumer prices have been rising steadily since 1965—much of the 
time at an accelerating rate. Continued substantial increases are now 
widely anticipated over the months and years ahead ... [I]n this 
environment, workers naturally seek wage increases sufficiently large 
... to get some protection against future price advances ... 
[T]houghtful employers ... reckon, as they now generally do, that cost increases probably can be passed on to buyers grown accustomed to 
inflation. (Burns, 1978, p.126) 
  Policymakers understood that, in principle, inflation could be stopped with a 
sufficiently restrictive monetary policy, but they were concerned that the short-run costs, in 
terms of lost output, would be intolerable. In an appearance before the House of 
Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency, July 30, 1974, Burns said: 
One may therefore argue that relatively high rates of monetary 
expansion have been a permissive factor in the accelerated pace of 
inflation. I have no quarrel with this view. But an effort to use harsh 
policies of monetary restraint to offset the exceptionally powerful 
inflationary forces of recent years would have caused serious financial 
disorder and economic dislocation. That would not have been a 
sensible course for monetary policy. (Burns, 1978) 
In remarks before the Seventeenth Annual Monetary Conference of the American Bankers 
Association, Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18, 1970, Burns elaborated on his views about the 
costs of relying on money growth alone (without, say, wage and price controls) to reduce 
inflation. He thought the costs were so large that the strategy was fundamentally infeasible on 
political grounds. In his words 
There are several reasons why excessive reliance on monetary 
restraint is unsound. First, severely restrictive monetary policies 
distort the structure of production. General monetary controls, despite 
their seeming impartiality, have highly uneven effects on different 
sectors of the economy. On the one hand, monetary restraint has 
relatively slight impact on consumer spending or on the investments 
of large businesses. On the other hand, the homebuilding industry, 
state and local construction, real estate firms, and other small 
businesses are likely to be seriously handicapped in 
their operations. When restrictive monetary policies are pursued 
vigorously over a prolonged period, these sectors may be so adversely 
affected that the consequences become socially and economically 
intolerable, and political pressures mount to ease up on the monetary 
brakes. ... An effort to offset, through monetary and fiscal restraints, all of the 
upward push that rising costs are now exerting on prices would be 
most unwise. Such an effort would restrict aggregate demand so 
severely as to increase greatly the risks of a very serious business 
recession. If that happened, the outcries of an enraged citizenry would 
probably soon force the government to move rapidly and aggressively 
toward fiscal and monetary ease, and our hopes for getting the 
inflationary problem under control would then be shattered. (Burns, 
1978)
9  
  Policymakers were so pessimistic about the prospects of getting inflation under control 
by restrictive monetary policy, that in August 1971 they turned to wage and price controls. 
Despite this, money growth continued to be strong (see figure 1).
10 This may seem like a 
problem for the expectations trap hypothesis, particularly the cost-push version. According to 
that hypothesis, high money growth is the Fed’s response to inflationary wage and price 
contracts, which are themselves driven by inflation expectations. But, inflationary wage and 
price contracts became illegal during the wage and price control period, which lasted until 
1973. So, this hypothesis seems to predict that money growth would have been low during the 
wage–price controls, not high.
11  
  The key to reconciling the expectations trap with this high money growth lies in 
interest rates. Policymakers were convinced that wage-price controls would not be politically 
feasible if interest rates were allowed to drift up. They thought that if this happened, the 
controls would be viewed as a cover for redistributing income from people earning wages and 
salaries to the (typically wealthy) people who earn interest. They feared that if this happened, 
then political support for the controls would evaporate, and inflation would take off again. So, 
policy was directed toward keeping the nominal interest rate about where it was before the 
severe monetary tightening of 1969 (see figure 4). It is interesting that it required such strong 
money growth to keep the interest rate at this level. A possible explanation is that this reflects 
the type of portfolio decisions emphasized in the working capital expectations trap hypothesis 
described earlier. That hypothesis predicts that, in the absence of high money growth, 
household portfolio decisions motivated by concerns about future inflation would drive up the 
rate of interest.   These considerations suggest to us that although the high money growth during wage–
price controls may well be an embarrassment to the expectations trap hypothesis, it isn’t 
necessarily so. Policymakers started dismantling wage–price controls in 1973. They were 
once again surprised by the strength with which inflation took off. They had anticipated some 
inflationary pressure, and they raised rates sharply in this period (see figure 4). But, they were 
surprised at just how strong the rise in inflation was.
12 The increase in rates was just a little 
greater than one measure of the rise in expected inflation. And, it just barely kept up with 
actual inflation.
13  
  Policymakers’ resolve began to fade when output and investment started to show 
weakness in the middle of 1973 and hours worked began to soften in late 1973. They had 
indicated repeatedly that they were unwilling to countenance a severe recession in the fight 
against inflation. Their concerns about the recessionary costs of fighting inflation seemed 
credible since they appeared to have been confirmed by the experience of the 1970 recession. 
Moreover, the 1960s and 1970s were times when governments were expected to do good 
things for their citizens, and hurting a subset of them for the sake of curing a social problem 
seemed unfair and wrong.
14 In an address before the joint meeting of the American Economic 
Association and the American Finance Association, on December 29, 1972, Burns expressed 
the general sense of the time: 
Let me note, however, that there is no way to turn back the clock and 
restore the environment of a bygone era. We can no longer cope with 
inflation by letting recessions run their course; or by accepting a 
higher average level of unemployment; or by neglecting programs 
whose aim it is to halt the decay of our central cities, or to provide 
better medical care for the aged, or to create larger opportunities for 
the poor. ... 
...There are those who believe that the time is at hand to ... rely 
entirely on monetary and fiscal restraint to restore a stable price level. 
This prescription has great intellectual appeal; unfortunately, it is 
impractical. ... If monetary and fiscal policies became sufficiently 
restrictive to deal with the situation by choking off growth in 
aggregate demand, the cost in terms of rising unemployment, lost 
output, and shattered confidence would be enormous. (Burns, 1978) So, toward late 1974, policymakers reversed course and adopted a loose monetary 
policy, driving interest rates down sharply, to turn the economy around. Note from figures 5 
and 6 that real interest rates were negative or close to zero. Of course, as the economy entered 
the deep 1975 recession, inflation came down substantially anyway. But, the turnaround in 
monetary policy then had the implication that inflation would take off again as soon as the 
economy entered the expansion.
15 Only later, in 1978 and 1979, did the Fed turn “tough” and 
consciously adopt a tight monetary policy until inflation came down (see how much higher 
the federal funds rate went in the early 1980s, and note how it stayed up—with the exception 
of a brief period of weakness in mid 1980—until after the inflation rate began to fall). 
  We interpret these observations as being consistent with the view that by the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. economy had fallen into an expectations trap. Through their 
words and actions, policymakers sent two clear messages to the population: 
·  It is technically feasible for policymakers to stop inflation. 
·  The costs of doing so were greater than policymakers could accept. 
Under these circumstances, it was perhaps reasonable for people to expect higher inflation. 
When wage–price controls began to be dismantled in 1973, it would have been reasonable for 
the public to think that there was now nothing left standing in the way of high inflation. 
Inflation expectations were even stronger than before. One indication of this is that actual 
inflation took much longer to begin falling during the 1974 recession than it did in the 1970 
recession. Ironically, while policymakers expressed frustration with the public for the seeming 
intransigence of their inflation expectations, the true cause of that intransigence may have 
been the nature of the monetary policy institutions themselves. This is the implication of the 
expectations trap hypothesis. 
Phillips curve hypothesis 
We now briefly consider the Phillips curve hypothesis about the take-off in inflation that 
occurred in the early 1970s. Like the expectations trap hypothesis, this hypothesis is also 
fundamentally monetarist in that it interprets the rise in inflation as reflecting an increase in 
money growth. It differs from the expectations trap hypothesis by highlighting a different set 
of motives on the part of the Fed. Policymakers believed the CEA estimates that output was 
below potential in 1971. Under the Phillips curve hypothesis, the Fed responded to this by 
adopting an aggressively expansionary monetary policy for the same sort of reasons that they 
appear to have done so in the early 1960s, to restore output and employment.   To see that the economy was below at least one measure of potential in 1991, consider 
the results in figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 displays quarterly data on (log) real gross domestic 
product (GDP) in the U.S. for the period 1966:Q1 to 1973:Q4. In addition, we report two 
estimates of potential GDP based on the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter.
16 One is computed 
using data covering the period, 1948:Q1–1998:Q1. A possible problem with this is that by 
using currently available data we may overstate the estimate of potential GDP available to 
policymakers in the early 1970s. They would not have been aware of the slowdown in trend 
(that is, potential) GDP that started around that time (Orphanides, 1999). This motivates our 
second estimate of potential output, which is based only on data for the period 1948:Q1–
1973:Q4. Note from figure 7 that the qualitative difference between the two estimates of 
potential is as expected. However, quantitatively, the difference in levels is quite small. The 
implied estimates of the output gap appear in figure 8.
17 Note that the two sets of estimates 
virtually coincide through 1970, and then diverge a little after that. Each estimate implies that 
the gap in 1971 averaged around 2 percent.
18 
  The 2 percent gap was substantial by historical standards (figure 8). Still, the notion 
that policymakers actively solicited higher inflation as a way to fight a weak economy 
conflicts sharply with the words of the chief monetary policymaker, Burns. Burns was very 
clear about his distaste for exploiting the Phillips curve for the sake of short-term gains. He 
certainly accepted the notion that policy could achieve higher output by increasing inflation. 
After all, his fears about the consequences of fighting inflation with reduced money growth 
were fundamentally based on a belief in a short-term Phillips curve. His view, which 
corresponded to the one espoused by Milton Friedman (1968), was that attempts to exploit the 
Phillips curve for short-term gains would only produce more trouble in the long run.
19 As he 
put it in testimony before Wright Patman’s House Committee on Banking and Currency, July 
30, 1974: 
We have also come to recognize that public policies that create excess 
aggregate demand, and thereby drive up wage rates and prices, will 
not result in any lasting reduction in unemployment. On the contrary, 
such policies—if long continued—lead ultimately to galloping 
inflation, to loss of confidence in the future, and to economic 
stagnation. (Burns, 1978, p. 170) It is hard to doubt the sincerity of these words. To Burns, an important lesson of the inflation 
of the 1970s was that price increases produced by temporary forces could lead to an 
intractable inflation problem later on. It would have taken an extraordinary amount of 
duplicity to, on the one hand, complain about the serious economic damage caused by past 
policy mistakes in not counteracting temporary forces, and on the other hand contribute to 
them himself.
20  
Springing the trap 
To evaluate our models, we require a simple characterization of what happened when the 
economy fell into the expectations trap in the early 1970s. For this, consider figures 9–11, 
which display the logarithm of real GDP, total hours worked in nonagricultural business, and 
business fixed investment, respectively. In addition, we display linear trends, computed using 
the data from the beginning of the sample to 1970:Q1, and extrapolated through the end of the 
sample. These lines draw attention to the trend change that occurred in these variables in the 
early 1970s. In addition, in each case we also fit a quadratic trend to the entire sample of data. 
  Consider the GDP data in figure 9 first. In this case, we have also included a linear 
trend fit to the data for the 1970s and extrapolated to the end of the sample. What is clear, by 
comparing the raw data with the two linear trends, is that the growth slowdown that started in 
the early 1970s became even more severe in the 1980s and the early 1990s. We infer from the 
fact that the slowdown persisted—even accelerated—in this period, that the inflation and 
other transient shocks that occurred in the early 1970s must have had little to do with it. Now 
consider hours worked in figure 10. Note how they take off beginning in the early 1970s, and 
how the growth rate seems to just increase continuously throughout the following decades. 
Again, we infer from the fact that the growth rate continued to rise after the inflation stopped 
that the inflation and other temporary factors in the early 1970s were not a factor in this 
development. Finally, note that investment shows very little trend change in the 1970s (see 
Figure 11). After a pause during the 1974–75 recession, investment returns to its former 
growth path. Investment does display weakness in the late 1980s and the 1990 recession. But 
after that, it grows again, returning to the pre-1970s trend line by 1997. 
  These changes in trend in hours worked and output complicate our attempts to assess 
alternative explanations of the inflation of the 1970s. Ideally, we would like to remove the 
effect on the data reflecting the factors underlying the persistent change in trend, and study 
the remainder. We have not found a clean way to do this. The approach we take removes a quadratic trend from each variable and assumes that the result reflects the effects of the 
inflation and bad supply shocks of the early 1970s. The results are displayed in figures 12–14. 
In the 1974–75 recession hours worked fell to around 6 percent below trend, investment was 
down 11 percent, and output was down 3 percent. At the same time, inflation rose from 4 
percent in 1972 to 10 percent by the end of the recession. The federal funds rate went from 
around 4 percent in 1972 to a peak of around 12 percent near the end of the recession. The 
episode is a classic stagflation, with inflation going up and the economy, down. 
Models 
We now report on a quantitative evaluation of the expectations trap hypothesis. For this, we 
need a mathematical representation of the way the central bank conducts monetary policy and 
of the way the private economy is put together. We describe two models of the private 
economy: the limited participation model of Christiano and Gust (1999) and the sticky price, 
IS–LM model of Clarida et al.
21  
Monetary policy rules 
There is widespread agreement that the right way to model the Fed’s monetary policy is along 
the lines proposed by Taylor (1993, 1999a). He posits that the Fed pursues an interest rate 
target, which varies with the state of the economy. A version of this policy rule was estimated 
using data from the 1970s by Clarida et al. They estimated that the Fed’s monetary policy 
causes the actual federal funds rate, Rt., to evolve as follows:  
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In words, Rt. is a weighted average of the current target value, R*t, and of its value in the 
previous period. By setting r = 0, the Fed would achieve its target, Rt. = R*t, in each period. It 
might instead prefer 0 < r < 1 if R*t exhibits more volatility than it wishes to see in the actual 
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where Pt is the price level, Et is the date t conditional expectation and yt is the percent 
deviation between actual output and trend output. The estimated values of r, a, and g are 
0.75, 0.8, and 0.44, respectively. We use these parameter values in our analysis.
22   The idea is that a tough central banker who is committed to low inflation would adopt 
a rule with a large value of a. A central banker that is less able to commit to low inflation 
would have a low value of a. Clarida et al.’s estimate for the 1970s is relatively low. The 
value they estimate using data after 1979 is higher, and this is a period when monetary policy 
is thought to have been characterized by greater commitment to low inflation. To see how 
much tougher monetary policy became in 1979, consider figures 5, 6, and 15. Figures 5 and 6 
show that the real rate was noticeably higher in this period. Figure 15 exhibits the difference 
between what the federal funds rate actually was and what it was predicted to be based on 
equation 1). Up until 1979, these differences were on average close to zero. After 1979, the 
average shifts up noticeably (see the horizontal line). This indicates that the actual funds rate 
in that period was higher than what a policymaker following the pre-1979 rule would have 
allowed. 
  How well does this policy rule capture our observations about monetary policy in the 
1970s? In one sense, it misses. We saw that there were times when the Fed was very tough, 
and other times when it was accommodating. We think of this policy rule as capturing the 
Fed’s behavior on average. On average, it was accommodating. 
Two models of the private economy 
We now present a brief verbal description of the models used in the analysis. The 
mathematical equations characterizing both models may be found in Christiano and Gust 
(1999). 
  Consider the limited participation model first. Recall that this model emphasizes a 
working capital channel in the firm sector: In order to produce output in a given period, firms 
must borrow funds from the financial intermediary. By increasing and decreasing its 
injections of liquidity, the central bank can create an abundance or scarcity of those funds. 
The resulting interest rate fluctuations then have a direct impact on production. A scarcity of 
funds in the financial intermediary drives up the interest rate and induces firms to cut back on 
borrowing. With fewer funds with which to hire factors of production, they cut back on 
production. Similarly, an abundance of funds leads to a fall in the interest rate and an 
expansion of output. 
  The mechanism whereby a rise in expected inflation may lead to a rise in actual 
inflation in this model was sketched earlier, but we summarize it again here for convenience. 
When there is an increase in expected inflation (that is, Et log (pt+1) rises) and a < 1, this translates into a decrease in the real interest rate, Rt. – Et log (pt+1). This leads households to 
reduce their deposits with the financial intermediary, and has the effect of creating a scarcity 
of the funds available for lending to firms. Upward pressure develops on the rate of interest. 
In pursuing its policy of not letting the interest rate rise too much, the monetary authority 
must inject some liquidity into the banking system. This injection then produces a rise in 
prices, thus validating the original rise in inflation expectations. Since the monetary authority 
does permit some rise in the nominal rate of interest (that is, a > 0), this has the effect of 
depressing output, employment, consumption, and investment. Thus, the limited participation 
model predicts that a self-fulfilling inflation outburst is associated with stagflation. 
  The pure logic of the model permits an inflation outburst to be triggered for no reason 
at all or in response to some other shock. In our modeling exercise, we treat the jump in 
expectations as occurring in response to a transitory, bad supply shock. Here, we have in mind 
the commodity supply shocks, including the oil shock, of the early 1970s. 
  Now consider the Clarida et al. model. In that model, a fall in the real rate of interest 
stimulates the interest-sensitive components of demand. The expansion of demand raises 
output and employment through a standard sticky price mechanism. In particular, firms are 
modeled as setting their prices in advance and then accommodating whatever demand 
materializes at the posted price. As output increases, the utilization of the economy’s 
resources, particularly labor, increases. This produces a rise in costs and these are then 
gradually (as the sticky price mechanism allows) passed into higher prices by firms. In this 
way an increase in the expected inflation rate gives rise to an increase in actual inflation, as 
long as a < 1. 
  A feature of Clarida et al.’s model is that it does not have investment or money. The 
absence of investment reflects the assumption that only labor is used to produce output. 
Money could presumably be incorporated by adding a money demand equation and then 
backing out the money stock using output and the interest rate. Clarida et al. do not do this 
and neither do we. 
  Evidently, the Clarida et al. model implies that a self-fulfilling outburst of inflation is 
associated with a rise in employment and output. If there were no other shocks in the model, 
then it is clear that the Clarida et al. model would have a problem, since it would be 
inconsistent with the phenomenon of stagflation observed in the 1970s. However, we treat the 
Clarida et al. model in the same way as the limited participation model. In particular, we model the jump in inflation expectations as occurring in response to a bad supply shock. So, 
in principle, it might be compatible with the low output observed in the 1970s because of the 
bad supply shock. 
Interpreting the Taylor rule in the two models 
The various hypotheses about inflation that we discuss in this article focus on the motives of 
policymakers. The Taylor rule summarizes their decisions, and is silent on what motives 
produced these decisions. Still, in assessing the limited participation and Clarida et al. models, 
it is useful to speculate on what sort of motives might produce a Taylor rule with a < 1 in 
these models. 
  In the limited participation model, we interpret a < 1 as reflecting the working capital 
expectations trap considerations discussed above. That is, in this model a rise in inflation 
expectations confronts the Fed with a dilemma because it places the goals of low inflation and 
stable output in direct conflict. An interpretation of a < 1 is that this reflects the Fed’s 
relatively greater concern for the output goal, as in the working capital expectations trap 
scenario. 
  By contrast, in the Clarida et al. model a rise in expected inflation does not put the low 
inflation, stable output goals in conflict. By simply saying no to high money growth and 
inflation, the Fed in the Clarida et al. model prevents output and inflation from simultaneously 
going above trend. So, a < 1 in the Clarida et al. model does not appear to reflect the type of 
central bank dilemmas that are at the heart of the expectations trap scenarios described above. 
Perhaps the only interpretation of a < 1 in the Clarida et al. model is that it reflects a mistake 
on the part of policymakers. They are not aware that with a < 1, a self-fulfilling inflation 
outburst is possible. Thinking about the 1970s using this model, it says that policymakers 
simply did not know that they could have gotten out of the high inflation by raising the rate of 
interest sharply. Our reading of the policymaking record of this period makes us deeply 
skeptical of this idea.
23 
Evaluating the models 
Neither of our models captures the events at the level of detail described earlier, nor would we 
want them to. The question is whether we have a model that captures the broad outlines of the 
takeoff in inflation in the 1970s. 
We construct a simulation of the 1970s using the two models described in the previous 
section. We specify that the fundamental exogenous shock in this period is a shift down in the production function by 1 percent.
24 That is, for each level of the inputs, output fell by 1 
percent. Inflation expectations in the wake of this shock are not pinned down. They are 
exogenous variables, like the technology shock.
 25 We picked expectations by requiring that 
the price response in the period of the production function shock is the same between the two 
models. 
Consider the limited participation model first.
 26 Figure 16 exhibits the response of the 
variables in that model to a bad technology shock. The shock occurs in period 2. Not 
surprisingly, in view of our earlier discussion, the shock drives output and employment down 
and inflation up. The monetary authority reacts immediately to the increase in inflation 
expectations by reducing the money supply to push up the rate of interest (recall, the 
coefficient on expected inflation in the Taylor rule is positive). 
  Notice the variable, Q, in the model. That is the part of households’ financial wealth 
that they hold in the form of transactions balances. When inflation expectations go up and a < 
1, then households increase Q and correspondingly reduce the part of their financial wealth 
that they deposit with financial intermediaries. The increased value of Q in period 3 reflects 
households’ higher inflation expectations. They understand that the monetary authority’s 
policy rule implies that the nominal rate of interest will go up, but that it will go up by less 
than the increase in inflation expectations (that is, 0 < a < 1). That is, they expect the real rate 
to go down. This leads them to increase the funds allocated to the goods market by raising Q3, 
that is, to drain funds from the financial intermediary. To guarantee that the rate of interest 
only rises by a small amount (a is small), the monetary authority must inject funds into the 
financial intermediary to make up for the loss of funds due to the rise in Q3. The rise in the 
interest rate that occurs with all this produces a fall in output and employment. The stagflation 
persists for a long time. Money growth, inflation, and the nominal interest rate remain high 
for years. Output, employment, consumption, and investment are down for years. Investment 
is low, despite the low real rate of interest, because inflation acts like a tax on investment in 
this model.
27 Note that the effects are quite large. Output and employment remain 2 percent 
below trend for a long time, and money growth, inflation, and interest rates are more than 6 
percentage points above their steady state. The fall in investment is over 6 percent. Inflation 
rises from 4 percent to about 10 percent and the interest rate rises from about 7.2 percent to 10 
percent. These results are tentative, however, since the size of supply shock, 1 percent, was 
not based on a careful analysis of the data. Nor was the response of inflation expectations chosen carefully. Still, the results build confidence that the working capital expectations trap 
hypothesis can deliver quantitatively large effects. 
  What is the reason for these persistent and large effects following a technology shock? 
Fundamentally, it is bad monetary policy. With a less accommodating monetary policy, it 
would not be an equilibrium for inflation expectations to jump so much, and so the nominal 
interest rate would not rise so much. With a smaller interest rate rise, the negative output and 
employment response to a bad technology shock would be reduced. Figure 17 exhibits what 
happens in our benchmark limited participation model when the policy rule estimated by 
Clarida et al. to have been followed in the post-Volcker period is used.
 28 In this case, the 
equilibrium is (locally) unique.
29 Note that the fall in output and employment is smaller here. 
The rise in the interest rate is smaller too. 
  We think of small value of a in the pre-Volcker policy rule as reflecting that the rule 
is the decision of a policymaker without an ability to commit to low inflation. If we interpret 
the inability to commit as reflecting that the policymaker has too soft a heart for economic 
agents, then there is plenty of irony here. The soft-hearted policymaker in the end does greater 
damage to the economy than a hard-hearted one who can commit to low inflation.
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  Now consider the Clarida et al. model. Figure 16 exhibits the dynamic response of the 
variables in that model to a 1 percent drop in technology. Note from the figure that in the 
Clarida et al. model, employment and output rise in response to the shock. After four quarters, 
output is down, but the employment response remains up for several years. This dynamic 
response pattern reflects two things. First, in sticky price models the direct effect on output of 
a bad technology shock is at most very small, since output is demand determined. As a result, 
a bad technology shock actually has a positive effect on employment in these models (see 
Gali, 1999, and Basu and Fernald, 1999).
 31 Second, a self-fulfilling rise in inflation by itself 
produces a rise in output and employment in the Clarida et al. model, as the fall in the real rate 
of interest stimulates the interest sensitive components of aggregate demand. 
  The simulation results in effect present the combined effects of both a self-fulfilling 
rise in inflation and a bad technology shock. In view of the observations in the previous 
paragraph, it is not surprising that the response of employment is positive. Output is also high 
for several quarters, although it eventually goes negative as the effect of the bad technology 
shock swamps the effect of the increase in employment. The employment response in 
particular puts this model in sharp conflict with the observed stagflation of the 1970s.   We conclude that the limited participation model provides a reasonable interpretation 
of the takeoff in inflation in the 1970s as a working capital expectations trap. The effects in 
the model are large, and qualitatively of the right type: The model predicts a stagflation. The 
alternative model that we examine, the one proposed in Clarida et al., provides a less 
convincing explanation of the 1970s. The model predicts a boom. In addition, as discussed in 
the previous section, the model’s explanation of why policymakers allowed the inflation rate 
to take off is not very compelling. 
Conclusion 
We have argued that the expectations trap hypothesis helps explain the high inflation in the 
early 1970s, particularly the take-off that began in 1973. We have argued against another 
hypothesis, the Phillips curve hypothesis. According to that, the high inflation was an 
unfortunate but necessary risk that the Fed was willing to take when it decided to jump-start a 
weakened economy in the early 1970s. These hypotheses are in fact quite similar, and so it 
may appear that we are splitting hairs in trying to differentiate between them. Is there 
anything at stake in the distinction? 
  We believe there is. Under the Phillips curve hypothesis, preventing a repeat of the 
high inflation of the 1970s is a relatively easy task: just say no to high money growth as a way 
to stimulate the economy. Under the expectations trap hypothesis, the problem of inflation is 
not solved so easily. 
According to the expectations trap hypothesis, high inflation is the Fed’s reaction to 
pressures originating in the private economy. The entire policymaking establishment, when 
confronted with these pressures, may truly not want to say no. To see this, imagine that bad 
supply shocks drove prices and unemployment up, and people responded by signing 
inflationary wage and price contracts. Certainly, the Fed would not be happy about following 
the path of accommodation and validating the expectations incorporated in the wage and price 
contracts. But, it may well choose to do so anyway. With the White House, the Congress, and 
the public at large bearing down on it like a great tsunami, the Fed may simply feel it has no 
choice. 
  So, the expectations trap hypothesis implies that it is not so easy to prevent a 
resurgence of a 1970s style inflation. According to that hypothesis, fundamental institutional 
change is needed to guarantee that people would never reasonably expect a take-off in 
inflation in the first place. What sort of institutional change might that be?   We have not attempted to answer this question. There is a large range of possibilities. 
One is that the necessary changes have already occurred. According to that, the simple 
memory of what happened in the inflation of the 1970s is enough to stay the hand of a 
policymaker tempted to validate the expectations incorporated in inflationary wage and price 
contracts. This is of course an attractive possibility, but there is reason to doubt it. When the 
expectations trap argument is worked out formally, it is assumed that the policymaker has 
unlimited memory, a clear understanding of the consequences of alternative actions, and 
excellent foresight (see Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum, 1998). The logic of expectations 
traps simply has nothing to do with ignorance. So, the notion that expectations traps became 
less likely when our eyes were opened by the experience of the 1970s does not seem 
compelling. 
  Another possibility is that changes in legislation are needed, changes that focus the 
legal mandate of the Fed exclusively on inflation. This would make it harder for a Congress 
and White House, panicked by high unemployment and inflation, to pressure the Fed into 
tossing inflation objectives to the wind in favor of unemployment. Understanding this in 
advance, the public would be unlikely to raise inflation expectations in response to transient 
events, as it seems to have done in the early 1970s. 
  The expectations trap hypothesis does not say what change is needed to prevent a self-
fulfilling take-off in inflation expectations. What it does say is that if the government finds a 
way to credibly commit to not validating high inflation expectations, then costly jumps in 
inflation expectations will not occur in the first place. 
 Appendix: Burns and Nixon 
It has been argued that, as chairman of the Federal Reserve, Arthur Burns simply did 
what President Nixon told him to do. Burns initially joined the Nixon administration as a 
special advisor to President Nixon when the latter took office in 1968. The idea is that the 
boss–employee nature of that relationship continued when Nixon appointed Burns to be 
chairman of the Federal Reserve. This impression was reinforced by Stanford Rose in a 
famous article in Fortune magazine in 1974, which suggested that Nixon was able to 
interrupt the policymaking committee of the Fed with a one-hour telephone call and 
control the outcome of the meeting. 
  Nixon apparently did have hopes of influencing Burns when he appointed Burns 
chairman of the Federal Reserve. In his fascinating biography of Burns, Wells (1994, p. 
42) quotes Nixon as having said to Burns: “You see to it: No recession.” 
  But, according to Wells (1994), the impression that Arthur Burns operated at the 
behest of Nixon is in fact completely untrue. Arthur Burns was a man with legendary 
self-confidence and a powerful, imposing personality. He had been an influential 
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under Eisenhower and left a stamp on 
that institution that is felt even today. During that time, according to Wells (p. 29), Burns’ 
relationship to Nixon was that of a “... senior partner: He was older than Nixon and 
enjoyed more influence with Eisenhower and his lieutenants than did the vice-president. 
Burns thought of Nixon as a protege and treated him with what one friend described as 
‘slight condescension.’ ... After Nixon became president, Burns had trouble adjusting to a 
subordinate position. ... He lectured Nixon on whatever issue was at hand, usually at 
great length and in considerable detail. Burns would also bluntly contradict the president 
or anyone else in the administration with whom he disagreed. ...” The diaries of H. R. 
Haldeman (1994), Nixon’s chief of staff, confirm this impression of a self-assured Burns 
who expected to get his way. For example, here are a couple of entries about Burns while 
he was in the Nixon White House: (p. 54) “... Huge Burns flap because he didn't get in to 
see [the President]...;” (p. 59) “Big flap with Arthur Burns on AID. ...”   Wage and price controls were a major source of friction between Burns and 
Nixon: Burns concluded that they were necessary, and Nixon was opposed. For example, 
according to Haldeman (1994, p. 310) Nixon told his cabinet on June 29, 1971, “Our 
decisions are that there will be no wage–price controls, no wage–price board.” According 
to Wells (pp. 70–77), the disagreement provoked ‘ugly’ confrontations between Burns 
and the White House, as Burns went public with his views. In the end, in mid-August, 
Nixon decided to impose wage–price controls after all. The episode shows that, as Wells 
(1994) puts it (p. 100), “The chairman was clearly no pliant tool of the chief executive 
but rather did whatever he thought was best.” 
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1Also, see Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998). 
2This model is a modified version of the model in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998). 
3The model is derived from a dynamic general equilibrium model with maximizing agents and cleared markets. The 
possibility that such a model could, under the sort of policy estimated by Clarida et al. using data from the 1970s, have an 
equilibrium in which inflation expectations can be self-fulfilling was first discovered by Kerr and King (1996). 
4In this article, we focus on expectations traps in which inflation is high. The opposite—an expectation trap in which 
inflation is low—is also a possibility. 
5The cost-push expectations trap is very close to the hypothesis Blinder advances as an explanation of the takeoff of 
inflation in the early 1970s: 
Inflation from special factors can “get into” the baseline rate if it causes an acceleration 
of wage growth. At this point policymakers face an agonizing choice--the so-called 
accommodation issue. To the extent that aggregate nominal demand is not expanded to 
accommodate the higher wages and prices, unemployment and slack capacity will 
result. There will be a recession. On the other hand, to the extent that aggregate 
demand is expanded (say, by raising the growth rate of money above previous targets), 
inflation from the special factor will get built into the baseline rate. (Blinder, 1982, p. 
264) 
6For one prominent commentator who takes this position, see Barro (1996, pp. 58–60). 
7The data are taken from Citibase. The mnemonic for the federal funds rate is fyff, and the mnemonic for the monetary 
base is fmbase. 
8Inflation is measured as the annual percent change in the Consumer Price Index with Citibase mnemonic, prnew (CPI-W: 
all items). 
9In the same speech, Burns showed some foresight in warning about another danger associated with the strategy of relying 
on reduced money growth to stop inflation. He was concerned that the nature of the lags in monetary policy were such that 
the variance of inflation and money growth would go up in a “stop-and-go” process. 
[T]he effects of monetary restraint on spending often occur with relatively long lags. ... 
Because the lags tend to be long, there are serious risks that a stabilization program 
emphasizing monetary restraint will have its major effects on spending at a point in 
time when excess demand has passed its peak. The consequence may then be an 
excessive slowdown of total spending and a need to move quickly and aggressively 
toward stimulative policies to prevent a recession. Such a stop-and-go process may 
well lead to a subsequent renewal of inflationary pressures of yet greater intensity. 
(Burns, 1978) 
10Money growth in 1970–74 was 5.32 percent, 7.60 percent, 7.27 percent, 8.75 percent, and 7.99 percent, respectively. The 
number for period t is 100 x log (m(t)/m(t – 1)), where m(t) denotes the monetary base, t = 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, and 
1974. 
11We address the potential for the Phillips curve hypothesis to explain high money growth during the period of wage–price 
controls in the next subsection. 
12To some extent, the rise in inflation was due to the oil shock in late 1973. However, about three-quarters of the price 
increases of that year occurred before the Yom Kippur war and the October oil embargo. The takeoff in inflation in 1973 may, in part, have reflected the delayed response of prices to the high money growth that occurred during the period of 
wage–price controls. We attempted to estimate what fraction of the 1973 price rise reflected past money growth, but found 
that statistical uncertainty is too large to draw a definite conclusion. 
13We calculated expected inflation for figure 5 based on a one-month-ahead forecast of monthly CPI inflation using five-
month lags in monthly inflation, four-month lags in the federal funds rate, four-month lags in the monthly growth rate in 
M2, and four-month lags in the premium in the return to ten-year Treasury bonds over the federal funds rate. The rise in 
real rates reported in figures 5 and 6 would have been somewhat larger if we had used the GDP deflator to measure 
inflation. 
14With the experience of the Great Depression and the intellectual foundations provided by Keynes’ General Theory, it was 
generally accepted that governments’ responsibility was to preserve the health of the economy. This was put into law in the 
Employment Act of 1946, which created the Council of Economic Advisors: 
There is hereby created in the Executive Office of the President a Council of Economic 
Advisers ... to formulate and recommend national economic policy to promote 
employment, production, and purchasing power under free competitive enterprise. 
See DeLong (1995) for a discussion of the post-WWII intellectual climate regarding the proper role of government in the 
economy and the sharp contrast with the pre-WWII climate. As noted earlier, the feasibility of the notion that the 
government ought to stabilize the economy seemed to be confirmed with the apparent success of stabilization policy in the 
1960s. 
15This was precisely the stop-and-go process that Burns feared, as mentioned in footnote 9. For another discussion of the 
stop-and-go nature of inflation in this period, see Barsky and Kilian (2000). 
16The trend implicit in the HP filter is a fairly standard way to estimate potential GDP. For example, the OECD (1999, p. 
205) reports estimates of the output gap computed in this way. Taylor (1999b) also uses this method to compute the output 
gap. Finally, according to Orphanides and van Norden (1999, p. 1), “The difference between [actual output and potential 
output] is commonly referred to as the business cycle or the output gap (italics added).” For an analysis of the statistical 
properties of this way of computing the output gap, see Christiano and Fitzgerald (1999). 
There are other output gap measures based on a different notion of trend. In these, the trend corresponds to the 
“nonaccelerating inflation” level of the variable: the level which, if it occurred, would produce a forecast of zero change in 
the rate of inflation in the near future. Gap concepts like this are fundamentally multivariate. To see how the HP filter can 
be adapted to correspond more closely to this alternative gap concept, see Laxton and Tetlow (1992) and St-Amant and 
Van Norden (1997). We assume that, for our purposes, it does not matter significantly whether the output gap is measured 
based on the adjusted or unadjusted versions of the HP filter. 
17The output gap is measured as 100 x (logGDP – logGDP
trend), where logGDP
trend is the trend in log GDP implied by the 
HP filter. 
18The average gap for 1971 was –1.75 percent according to the full sample estimate and –1.99 percent according to the 
sample that stops in 1973:Q4. 
19See Wells (1994), p. 72, for a further discussion of Burns’ view about the Phillips curve. 
20It has been argued that even if Burns was not himself duplicitous, President Nixon was, and Burns acted at the behest of 
Nixon. To us, the record is inconsistent with this view. See the appendix. 
21The limited participation model that we use is a modified version of the model in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
(1998). 
22Clarida et al. (1998) use revised data to estimate the policy rule for the 1970s. Orphanides (1997) argues that constructing 
yt using final revised data may give a very different view of yt than policymakers in the 1970s actually had. As noted above, 
he argues that the productivity slowdown that is thought to have occurred beginning in the early 1970s was not recognized 
by policymakers until much later in that decade. As a result, according to Orphanides, real-time policymakers in the 1970s 
thought that output was further below potential than current estimates suggest. In private communication, Orphanides has 
informed us that when he uses real-time data on yt and the other variables to redo the Clarida et al. estimation procedure, he 
finds that the point estimates for r, a, and b for the 1970s change. They move into the region where our models no longer imply that self-fulfilling inflation take-offs are possible. The standard errors on the point estimates are large, however, and 
a standard confidence interval does not exclude the Clarida et al. point estimates that we use. 
23Woodford (1998) develops an alternative interpretation of a < 1, by building on the assumption that fiscal policy 
(something we abstract from in our analysis) was ‘non-Ricardian’ during the 1970s. Using the fiscal theory of the price 
level, he argues that with fiscal policy satisfying this condition, the Fed was forced to set a < 1 to avoid an even more 
explosive inflation than the one that actually occurred. For a simplified explanation of this argument, see Christiano and 
Fitzgerald (2000). The fiscal theory of the price level offers another potential explanation of the take-off in inflation in the 
1970s, one that is not based on self-fulfilling expectations, and which assigns a central role to fiscal policy rather than 
monetary policy. While this interpretation is controversial, it deserves serious consideration. See Cochrane (1998) and 
Woodford (1998) for further discussion.  
24The production function is 
1 exp( ) , tt t t Yz K L
qq - =  where Yt denotes gross output, Kt denotes the stock of capital, and Lt 
denotes labor. The state of technology, zt, evolves according to zt = rz zt-1 + ez,t, with rz = 0.95. In the limited participation 
model, q = 0.36 and in Clarida et al., q = 0. The simulation involves setting ez,t = –0.01 for t = 2 and ez,t = 0 for all other t. 
With this value of rz, the state of technology remains 0.7 percent below trend after ten periods and 0.4 percent below trend 
after 20 periods. 
25There is one important difference. Shocks to the production function can occur for any parameter values of the model. 
Shocks to expectations can only exist for certain parameter values. 
26For details of model parameterization, see Christiano and Gust (1999). The version of the limited participation model 
underlying the calculations in figure 16 is the one in which investment is a cash good, what Christiano and Gust (1999) call 
the “benchmark” model. They also consider the version of the model in which investment is a credit good. The simulation 
of the 1970s using the Clarida et al. estimated Taylor rule resembles the results in figure 16. 
27Feldstein (1997) has argued that high inflation hurts investment, though he emphasizes a mechanism that operates 
through the explicit tax system. 
28This uses a larger value of a. 
29The result that raising a above unity eliminates expectations traps (at least, locally) is somewhat model specific. In some 
models this does not work and the central bank would have to adopt a different policy to rule out expectations traps. 
30It deserves repetition that the policy rules have not been derived from well-specified optimization problems of 
policymakers and that our discussion represents an informal interpretation. For an explicit analysis based on policymaker 
optimization, see Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998). 
31The reasoning is simple. Let D denote demand and P and Y denote price and output. Then, PY = D. In a sticky price 
model, P cannot change so that if D does not change then Y cannot change either, even if there is a shock to technology. Of 
course, if the shock is such that it takes more people to produce a given level of output, then a fall in technology results in a 
rise in employment. Barro, Robert J., 1996, Getting it Right, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press. 
 
Barksy, Robert B., and Lutz Kilian, 2000, “A monetary explanation of the Great Stagflation 
of the 1970s,” National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper, No. 7547, February. 
 
Basu, Susanto, and John G. Fernald, 1999, “Why is productivity procyclical? Why do we 
care?,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance, discussion 
paper, No. 638. 
 
Blinder, Alan, 1982, “Anatomy of double-digit inflation in the 1970s,” in Inflation: Causes 
and Effects,” (R. Hall, ed.), Chicago: National Bureau of Economic Research and University 
of Chicago Press. 
 
Burns, Arthur, 1978, “Reflections of an economic policy maker, speeches, and 
congressional statements: 1969–1978,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, Washington, paper. 
 
Burns, Arthur, and W. C. Mitchell, 1934, Production Trends in the United States since 
1870, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Chari, V. V., Lawrence J. Christiano, and Martin Eichenbaum, 1998, “Expectation traps 
and discretion,” Journal of Economic Theory, August, pp. 462–492. 
 
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans, 1998, “Modeling 
money,” National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper, No. 6371. 
 
Christiano, Lawrence J., and Terry Fitzgerald, 1999, “The band pass filter,” National 
Bureau of Economic Research, working paper, No. 7257. 
 
Christiano, Lawrence J., and Terry Fitzgerald, 2000, ‘Understanding the fiscal theory of 
the price level,’ Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Review, forthcoming. 
 
Christiano, Lawrence J., and Christopher Gust, 1999, “Taylor rules in a limited 
participation model,” National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper, No. 7017. 
 
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler, 1998, “Monetary policy rules and 
macroeconomic stability: Evidence and some theory,” National Bureau of Economic 
Research, working paper, No. 6442. 
 
Cochrane, John, 1998, ‘A Frictionless View of US Inflation,’ NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual 1998, MIT Press, pp. 323-384. 
 
DeLong, Bradford, 1995, “Keynesianism, Pennsylvania Avenue style: Some economic 
consequences of the Employment Act of 1946,” University of California at Berkeley, 
Department of Economics, unpublished manuscript. 
 Feldstein, Martin, 1997, “The costs and benefits of going from low inflation to price 
stability,” in Reducing Inflation, Motivation and Strategy, C. D. Romer and D. H. Romer 
(eds.), Studies in Business Cycles, Vol. 30, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Friedman, Milton, 1968, “The role of monetary policy,” American Economic Review, Vol. 
58, pp. 1–21. 
 
Gali, Jordi, 1999, “Technology, employment, and the business cycle: Do technology shocks 
explain aggregate fluctuations?,” American Economic Review; Vol. 89, No. 1, March, pp. 
249–271. 
 
Haldeman, H. R., 1994, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House, New York: 
G. P. Putnam’s Sons. 
 
Hodrick, Robert, and Edward Prescott, 1997, “Post-war business cycles: An empirical 
investigation,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 29, No. 1, February, pp. 1–16. 
 
Kerr, William, and Robert King, 1996, “Limits on interest rate rules in the IS-LM model,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, Spring, pp. 47–75. 
 
Laxton, Douglas, and R. Tetlow, 1992, “A simple multivariate filter for the measurement of 
potential output,” Bank of Canada, Ottawa, technical report, No. 59. 
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 1999, Economic 
Outlook, December. 
 
Orphanides, Athanasios, 1999, “The quest for prosperity without inflation,” Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, manuscript, May. 
 
                    , 1997, “Monetary policy rules based on real-time data,” Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economic Discussion Series, working paper, No. 
9803, December. 
 
Orphanides, Athanasios, and Simon Van Norden, 1999, “The reliability of output gap 
estimates in real time,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, manuscript, July. 
 
St-Amant, Pierre, and Simon Van Norden, 1997, “Measurement of the output gap: A 
discussion of recent research and the Bank of Canada,” Bank of Canada, manuscript. 
 
Taylor, John B. (ed.), 1999a, Monetary Policy Rules, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
                    , 1999b, “A historical analysis of monetary policy rules,” in Monetary Policy 
Rules, John B. Taylor (ed.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, chapter 7.  
 
                    , 1993, “Discretion versus policy rules in practice,” Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 39, New York and Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 
pp. 195–214. 
 Wells, Wyatt C., 1994, Economist in an Uncertain World: Arthur F. Burns and the Federal 
Reserve, 1970–1978, New York: Columbia University Press. 